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Should I Stay or Should I Go? Understanding 
Poland’s Adherence to Gold, 1928-1936 
Nikolaus Wolf ∗ 
Abstract: »Should I stay or should I go? Erklärungen für 
das lange Festhalten Polens am Goldstandard, 1928-1936«. 
This paper examines the decision of the Polish government 
to adhere to the gold standard during the Great Depression. 
Poland did not leave gold until April 1936 and suffered 
through one of the worst examples of a depression, with 
massive deflation and a complete collapse of industrial pro-
duction. The Polish case stands out against the experience 
of other European countries as can be shown in an eco-
nometric framework. I argue that Poland’s monetary policy 
was largely determined by non-economic considerations, 
especially attempts of the Piłsudski regime to defend Poland 
against foreign (esp. German) aggression. I provide evi-
dence that strongly supports this view until about mid-1933. 
Ironically, just after Poland had joined the gold-bloc there 
were signs of a broad strategic reorientation, which paved 
the way for an exit in 1936.  
1. Introduction: why Poland? 
At the end of the 19th century the monetary regime of the gold standard was 
nearly universal in Europe and the larger Atlantic economy. During World War 
One most countries left the gold standard but this was rather considered a tem-
poral demise of the “rules of the game” – comparable to the situation in  
England during the Napoleonic Wars – than a definite end of the system. How-
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ever, the re-establishment of an international monetary system during the 1920s 
was difficult and remained fragile. More broadly speaking, there is a very nota-
ble variation in monetary regime choices across countries during the 1920s and 
1930s compared to the earlier decades. In this paper I take up Barry Eichen-
green’s question of “why were some more inclined than others to release their 
gold fetters?” (Eichengreen 1992: 23) with respect to one specific case of the 
interwar period: the re-born Polish state.  
If compared against the background of the European economy the Polish 
case is intriguing. There is broad evidence that an early exit from gold helped 
the economies to overcome deflationary pressures and to recover (Eichengreen 
and Sachs 1985). Poland did not leave gold until April 1936 and suffered 
through one of the worst examples of a depression, with massive deflation and 
a complete collapse of industrial production. The existing literature on why 
Poland adhered to gold for such a long time is – not surprisingly – nearly en-
tirely written in Polish and it is old: its last original contribution was published 
about forty years ago. This Polish historiography considers the late exit from 
the gold standard as a “big misunderstanding” (Knakiewicz 1967: 336), mainly 
due to policymakers misled by the classical orthodox school who tried to cure 
the economy by deflation (Landau and Tomaszewski 1999: 235). The back-
ground to this is traditionally seen in a widespread fear among policymakers of 
yet another inflation after the experiences of the early 1920s and 1925/26 
which would destabilize the country and scare off badly needed foreign capital 
(Studentowicz 1935) and a perceived necessity to adjust industrial prices 
downwards to prices in agriculture to foster domestic demand for industrial 
products (Matuszewski 1937). Elsewhere (see Wolf 2007) I have put these 
arguments into a comparative European perspective. I have shown in an econo-
metric framework that it is hard to explain the Polish case within a model that 
is limited to the extent of deflationary pressures, the quest for “importing 
credibility” or the “mentality” of policymakers due to experiences of previous 
deflation as argued in the existing literature on the Poland. Only when the mo-
del is extended to account for differences in the political regime and for pat-
terns of economic integration, it can explain the extremely late exit decision of 
Poland. Apparently, Poland stayed on gold mainly because of the “authoritar-
ian” character of the regime and her integration with France that was remarka-
bly high given the geography of the country. But these factors are arguably 
mere black boxes that do little to help our understanding. 
To shed some light into the black boxes of “authoritarian rule” and “integra-
tion with France” I argue that the Piłsudski regime that ruled Poland since May 
1926 was mainly concerned with strategies to defend the independence and 
territorial integrity of the new Polish state against foreign (esp. German) ag-
gression. The perceived risk that leaving the gold standard can produce mone-
tary instability was in part due to the Polish experience of hyperinflation until 
1923 followed by a second inflation in 1925-26. But in difference to other 
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countries that experienced a hyperinflation in the 1920s (such as Austria or 
Hungary), the Polish government was afraid of an additional cost of leaving 
gold: loosing acess to „friendly” capital in terms of the political system of 
Versailles. It is obvious that for her long-run development Poland desperately 
needed to accumulate capital, through savings and capital imports. But the 
Polish government made much effort to be selective with regard to capital 
imports, increasingly so after the open conflict with Germany about renegotia-
ting trade conditions since 1925. It continued these efforts during the great 
depression. Crucially, the exit of Germany and Austria from gold in 1931 and 
the non-exit of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands created an incentive for 
the Piłsudski government to stay on gold as well. French armament credits 
complete this picture, both existing ones and others under negotiation well into 
1936. Bold rhetoric of monetary orthodoxy and several external factors includ-
ing some signs of economic recovery in late 1932 helped the Polish govern-
ment to defend this position, which culminated in Poland joining the “gold 
bloc” in July 1933. But ironically, just from 1933 onwards the pendulum 
slowly started to swing back. Increasing tensions with France, a temporal im-
provement in Polish-German relations, and worsening economic conditions 
reopened the discussion about monetary policy. The Central Bank started to 
engineer a slow increase in M1 from 1934 onwards, but most importantly, there 
was a growing pressure from military circles to speed up the modernization of 
the Polish army, even without French support. In October 1935 E. Kwiat-
kowski, just appointed minister of finance, started to realize his old plans of big 
push industrialization merged with military plans to set-up a Polish armament 
industry. After the Rhine crisis of March 1936 had proved French unwilling-
ness to fight for the political system of Versailles, and the defenders of the 
Franc Poincaré had started to retreat, Poland prepared the exit decision. In 
April 9th, 1936 a 1 billion Złoty National Defence Fund was set up to finance 
the modernization of Poland’s army, before Poland introduced exchange con-
trols in April 26nd, 1936 and thereby finally left the gold standard.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly discusses a 
unified model framework to understand the pattern of exit decisions across 
European economies during the interwar years. Moreover it reproduces some 
earlier findings that Poland fits into such a model only if we allow for some 
extensions. Based on this background, section III argues for a specific political 
economy story of the Polish case. Section IV concludes.  
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2. Poland in the European Context: an econometric 
exercise 
The literature offers many possible explanations for the observed variation in 
exit decisions and they all tend to be rather complex. In the following I present 
several hypotheses that are particularly prominent (see also Wolf and Yousef 
2005).  
To start with, countries that experienced bad macroeconomic shocks tended 
to deteriorate their economic situation when pursuing monetary orthodoxy, 
with the result of sharp price deflation, rising real wages, real interest rates, 
growing unemployment and a slump in industrial production (Newell and Sy-
mons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991). As shown in Eichengreen and Sachs 
(1985) an early exit might have allowed them to follow expansionary monetary 
policies and thereby help the economy to recover. Second, the promise of re-
covery from releasing the golden fetters had to be weighted against a possible 
loss in credibility as argued in Bordo, Edelstein and Rockoff (1999). Especially 
for peripheral or, for this matter, new states without a track record of monetary 
policy, the interwar gold standard continued to serve as a “good housekeeping” 
seal of approval. These results have been fundamentally questioned by Taylor 
and Obstfeld (2003) and may well be time-dependent: the more core-countries 
left the gold standard during the Great Depression, the weaker the credibility 
signal of adherence may have become (Wolf and Yousef 2005). Third, policy-
makers and their electorates may differ in their adhesion to monetary ortho-
doxy (their “mentality”) because of their own recent experience. In countries 
which suffered a hyperinflation or a significant depreciation of their currencies 
relative to the pre-war parities, one can expect a wide reluctance to adopt ex-
pansionary monetary policies (Eichengreen 1992). In the Polish context, this is 
the most widespread explanation to understand Poland’s belated exit (esp. 
Knakiewicz 1967).  
More recently it has been argued that this should be related to issues like 
central bank independence, insofar as the perceived risk of expansionary mone-
tary policies to produce hyperinflation may be smaller the less directly a gov-
ernment can affect monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Wolf 2007). 
Also, economic integration between country pairs differed widely during the 
interwar years. For example countries which traded intensively with the UK 
might have had stronger incentives to follow Britain off gold in 1931 than 
others, while integration with France may have had the opposite effect. In 
general, the exit decision of major trading partners could force a country to 
leave as well. The pattern of currency bloc formation after 1931 broadly sup-
ports this view (Ritschl and Wolf 2003), which challenges a recent literature on 
the trade creating effects of currency blocs (Rose 2000). Finally, the political 
system prevailing in a country can affect a country’s choice of monetary policy 
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for several reasons (Wandschneider 2005). The extension of the franchise 
(James 2001) and political instability (Eichengreen and Simmons 1995) might 
have weakened the ability of governments to commit to the rules of the gold 
standard. Authoritarian regimes in turn might have had tools at hand to defend 
the gold standard and successfully suppress any political quest for expansion-
ary full employment policies. This ability to defend the gold standard may have 
also increased with the weight of agriculture in the economy, insofar as politi-
cal parties demanding expansionary monetary policies tended to have their 
electorate in industrial centres. 
A simple and straightforward way to test the empirical relevance of each of 
these hypotheses is to estimate the probability to exit the interwar gold ex-
change system as a function of cross-sectional and time series variation in a 
large set of explanatory variables. In a related paper (Wolf 2007) I used 
monthly data to track the time-path of potential explanatory variables as closely 

















Here, the elements of the γ1 vector represent the partial elasticities of the 
likelihood to exit the gold standard with respect to the vector of variables Xt. I 
also provided estimates of a duration model (as in Wolf and Yousef 2005) as a 
robustness check and because it allows for a convenient visualisation of results 
in form of survival functions. In Wolf (2007) the model is estimated for eight 
European countries over the period January 1928 through December 1936, 
namely for the five largest countries in central Europe (Austria, Czechoslova-
kia, Germany, Hungary, and Poland) and their neighbours France, Italy and 
Sweden. The definition of variables is given in the appendix.  
The benchmark model tests for the “traditional” hypotheses on the extent of 
the shocks (captured by price deflation, industrial production and unem-
ployment), the credibility of further adherence (captured by changes in foreign 
exchange and gold reserves and the status of the two potential monetary he-
gemons UK and US), and the experience of previous inflations together with a 
measure of central bank independence. Next, the model is extended to include 
variables on the political regime and the pattern of trade integration. In general 
the benchmark model fits the data rather well, but the fit is significantly worse 
for Poland. The model predicts the late exit of Poland only if the “authoritar-
ian” character of the Piłsudski regime and the fact that Poland is highly inte-
grated with France are taken into account. Put differently, the estimated coeffi-
cients from the model can be used to construct counterfactual exit times: given 
that we control for variables X,Y but discount the effect from variables Z, how 
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long would Poland have stayed on gold? Table 1 summarizes the results of that 
exercise: 




mark model:  
 








Austria 09/1931 09/1931 - - 
Czechoslo-
vakia 
09/1931 10/1931 - - 
France 09/1936 Not before 12/1936 - - 
Germany 07/1931 07/1931 - - 
Hungary 07/1931 09/1932 - - 
Italy 05/1934 05/1934 - - 
Poland 04/1936 Not before 12/1936 09/1931 12/1934 
Sweden 09/1931 09/1931 - - 
Actual Exit defined as imposition of exchange controls and/ or devaluation; 
Source: Wolf (2007) 
 
Without taking the high trade integration with France into account, the 
model would predict that Poland leaves the gold standard in December 1934, 
just after Italy. Instead, if we drop the political regime variable, the model 
predicts that Poland would leave gold in September 1931, shortly after her 
largest trading partner Germany.1 If both effects are dropped, the model would 
predict an exit together with Germany in July 1931. A duration analysis deliv-
ers very similar results except that it has difficulties to capture the impact of 
variables with a time-trend (such as price deflation) on the regime choice. 
3. Why Poland did not exit, 1928-1936 
The notion of high trade integration with France in 1928 – with Germany still 
being Poland’s largest trading partner – and the empirical effect of the democ-
racy dummy hardly provide a satisfying explanation for Poland’s belated exit 
decision. However, they give a hint that an answer will have to take political 
                                                             
1 For this purpose, I re-estimated the model replacing the democracy dummy (which is 0 in 
the case of Poland over the sample period) by its inverse, an “autocracy” dummy. This ob-
viously alters only the constant and the sign of the dummy, but nothing else. Especially the 
predicted exit time for Poland remains unchanged at May 1935. When the prediction is 
done with setting this dummy =0, the model predicts an exit in July 1931.  
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factors into account, and that Poland’s relations with France played a specific 
role. The following section is an attempt to outline such an explanation.  
The return of Poland on the European map after the First World War was 
possible due to the specific constellation that all three former partition powers 
were severely weakened through war and revolution (see Wolf 2005). The 
borders of the new Polish state were not established before mid-1921, after 
several uprisings in Upper Silesia and Great Poland, some heavily disputed 
referenda, and a very costly Polish victory over the Red Army, financed by 
French and US capital and excessive inflation taxation (Krzyżanowksi 1976: 
13ff). From then onwards, the most direct threat to Poland’s territorial integrity 
was seen in German attempts to revise the Polish-German border, i.e. both the 
division of Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor, dividing the German East 
Prussia from Germany proper. None of the German governments during the 
Weimar Republic – whether left-wing, centre or right-wing – was ever willing 
to accept the German-Polish border (Schulze 1982).  
In this situation, Poland regarded France as her natural strategic partner, and 
initially, the French were eager to play that role. After 1918 France tried to 
strengthen Poland and Czechoslovakia as an “eastern barrier designed to keep 
Berlin in check and preserve the status quo” (Wandycz 1988: 3). French mili-
tary missions were present in both Poland and Czechoslovakia after 1918 to 
provide schooling and technical advice for their armies (Ciałowicz 1970). But 
in stark difference to Czechoslovakia, which inherited most of the Habsburg 
armament industry after the Great War, Poland had no significant armament 
industry and relied heavily on imports. In February 1921 Poland and France 
signed a secret military convention which obliged France to send war material, 
rolling stock, and technical personnel (but not troops) to Poland in case of 
either a German or a Russian aggression (Ciałowicz 1970: 403-405). Moreover, 
in 1921 France agreed on an armament credit over 400 million Francs, payable 
in several instalments, which was seen as crucial for a modernization of the 
Polish army.  
However, the economic realities of Poland in the 1920s were at odds with 
this strategic orientation, insofar as Poland inherited from the long period of 
partition very close economic ties both with Germany and the Habsburg suc-
cessor states including Austria.2 Table 2 shows the percentage shares of various 
countries in Polish foreign trade 1924-1936. The joint share of Germany and 
Austria in total Polish exports exceeded 50% in 1924 and 1925, and about 40% 
of all Polish imports came from these two countries. Also, German and Aus-
trian capital was by tradition heavily engaged in Polish banking and the mining 
industry, hence in key sectors of the economy (see Smerek 1933). The implica-
tions of this dependency became visible in early 1925, when Germany started 
to bilaterally renegotiate her trade relation with Poland after the restrictions 
                                                             
2 The economic relations with Russia, in contrast, were cut during the Great War and the 
Russian Revolution in 1918. See Wolf (2005).  
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imposed by the treaty of Versailles did not bind her any more (Landau and 
Tomaszewski 1999: 137). In June 1925 the Germans prohibited Polish coal 
imports until a new trade agreement would be signed, and Poland retaliated. 
The following “trade war” with Poland is clearly visible in a dramatic decline 
of Poland’s exports to Germany, which affected especially coal, but also agri-
cultural products. While Poland managed to substitute the German export mar-
ket – in part and temporarily – by exports to Britain (helped by the British coal 
strike), Poland was obviously the weaker side in the conflict, which made a 
deep impact on her economy. Together with heavy tax increases to support the 
newly (January 1924) established złoty and a poor harvest in 1924, the trade 
conflict produced an unfavourable balance of trade and put the Polish currency 
– just stabilized – under severe pressure (Smith 1936). Beyond this, the interna-
tional political landscape changed in October 1925 with the Locarno treaties, 
which were seen in Poland as a rapprochement between France and Germany 
against the spirit of the 1921 convention, not at least because Locarno lacked 
any guarantee for Poland’s western border (Wandycz 1988).  
All these factors helped to bring about the coup d’état of Marshall Piłsudski 
in May 1926, with its slogan of “Sanacja” – to “cure” Poland from political 
fragmentation in order to strengthen the new state on the international scene. 
One of the first apparent successes of the new regime was the stabilization of 
the currency in late 1926 and the agreement on a stabilization loan in 1927, 
which allowed Poland in October 1927 to join the international gold-exchange 
standard (Smith 1936). In the meantime, the Polish government made several 
efforts to foster an economic reorientation of the country reducing the depend-
ency from Germany. The backbone of these efforts was the development of 
Gdynia as main seaport to reduce dependency on Gdansk and railway transits 
through Germany, and the construction of a direct railway connection between 
the Upper Silesian coalfields and this new port. The central political figure here 
was Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, then minister of trade and industry. For both 
enterprises, the Polish government sought to attract French capital, not at least 
in order to create French vested interest in the Polish Corridor. These efforts 
were intensified during the Great Depression, in order to capitalize from the 
weakening of German banks and industry relative to their French competitors. 
In February 1930, after the consolidation of Poland’s wartime debt to France, 
the French cabinet authorized the signing of an agreement with a French con-
sortium for the completion of the Gdynia harbour, and negotiations began to 
create a Franco-Polish company to build and exploit a railroad linking Upper 
Silesia with this new harbour (Wandycz 1988: 168). In a similar vein, in Au-
gust 1931 the Polish chargé d’affaires Muehlstein discussed in Paris the possi-
bilities to replace the influence of German banks in Upper Silesia by French 
capital. “As long as the situation was normal, the fight with the German banks 
was very difficult, but now, when the German krach had undermined their 
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authority, it would just be a political sin not to use this opportunity and not to 
try to replace the German capital by French capital”.3  
At the same time, the question of how to finance the urgent modernization 
of the Polish army came up again because the depression started to produce 
growing budget deficits and because the government feared the growing politi-
cal instability in Germany. After a Polish attempt in July 1929 to negotiate a 
new French armament credit over 1.5 billion Francs had failed, renewed efforts 
to at least get the final instalment of the 1921 credit – frozen since Locarno – 
succeeded in February 1931. The deliveries were scheduled for May 1931 until 
December 1933 (Ciałowicz 1970: 162f). After this, the Polish side immediately 
attempted to discuss a new armament credit via ambassador Chłapowski in 
Paris. When this failed, Piłsudski sent a special envoy Targowski to Paris in 
November 1931 to explore chances for private armament credits (ibidem: 164) 
followed by an official request of the Polish General Staff about the price for a 
large delivery of heavy weapons. Note that the General Staff was eager to 
stress in this request the inability of Poland to realize a cash-transaction 
(ibidem: 166).  
In this political environment of 1931 it is hardly surprising that Poland fol-
lowed neither Germany nor later Britain off gold. In addition to a possible risk 
of inflation, the Polish government feared to lose access to French capital when 
it felt to need it most. Polish monetary policy apparently hinged to a large 
degree on the strategic considerations of the regime. Two further aspects sup-
port this view. First, in May 1931 Marshall Józef Piłsudski made his brother 
Jan minister of finance. He did this obviously to tighten his personal grip on 
economic policy because his brother had as little expertise in monetary policy 
as he himself. Jan Piłsudski was followed in September 1931 by W. M. 
Zawadzki, an eminent Polish economist, founding member of the Econometric 
Society, classical hardliner of orthodox monetary policy, and a confident of 
Piłsudski (Landau and Tomaszewski 1965). In a private memorial of late 1935, 
which – importantly – was never meant for publication, Zawadzki recapitulated 
his monetary policy as being based on two principles: first, to finance the mili-
tary (!) budget of the Polish state to which the whole economy must be 
adapted, and second to stick to the gold exchange standard. He describes his 
motivation for the latter as threefold: first, to gain access to foreign capital. 
Second, to avoid domestic turmoil after a destabilization of the currency that 
could undermine the authority of the regime. And finally third, Zawadzki men-
tions the fact that a devaluation of the złoty would “automatically decrease the 
military budget”, because it would decrease its purchasing power abroad.4 In 
addition, he was positively convinced that it was possible to overcome the 
                                                             
3 Own translation from a Letter of Muehlstein to Polish Foreign Minister Zaleski, August 8, 
1931, cited after Landau and Tomaszewski (1964: 315).  
4 Zawadzki (1935), reprinted in Landau and Tomaszewski (1965: 127-151, here especially 
page 134).  
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crisis by a downward adjustment of prices (Zawadzki 1935: 132), and pursued 
this policy until his demission in October 1935. 
This came clearly at a cost. Poland suffered through a severe economic cri-
sis, with more deflation and a worse decline in industrial output than in other 
European countries. And there was opposition. From 1932 onwards, a growing 
number of economists and politicians argued for a change in monetary policy, 
most notably the Kraków group around Krzyżanowski and Zweig that proposed 
in June 1932 a cautious devaluation without expansionary monetary policy; 
probably not a solution to the problem (see Knakiewicz 1967: 96). Members of 
the Central Bank’s board were split over the question of devaluation in mid-
1932, but the minister of finance (Zawadzki) had the final say (Karpiński 1958: 
113). What is more, the number of industrial strikes, factories affected and 
hours lost during strikes, started to increase slowly in 1932 (Mały Rocznik 
Statystyczny 1939: 284). The authoritarian government certainly had tools to 
oppress this opposition not available to democratic governments, but it was 
also helped by several other factors. The very high share of agriculture in the 
Polish economy implied that the suffering of a large part of the population 
during the depression years was limited, as they were unaffected by unem-
ployment and not threatened by starvation. As stated in the Economist: “Polish 
peasants have been accustomed for centuries to hard work and privation. (…) 
They have plenty to eat and enough to wear, and to the great bulk of the popu-
lation such problems as bank deposits, currency stability, etc., are not matters 
of consequence.” (Economist, September 26, 1931: 568) Note that this effect 
entered the estimations in Wolf (2007) insofar as the rate of unemployment was 
measured as the number of registered unemployed per active population. Given 
the extreme decline in industrial output, the comparatively low rate of unem-
ployment is explained by the low share of industry in the country. Also, there 
were some signs of a recovery in the third quarter of 1932, visible in a stabili-
zation of prices, a small increase in industrial production, and a decline in 
unemployment. Another factor that actually helped the Polish regime to stay on 
gold was the suspension of the gold exchange standard in the US in 1933. 
Since the Great War, the dollar had been a de facto second currency, especially 
in the southern parts of Poland (due to the tight migration relations of Galicia to 
the US), used for hoarding but also for common bank transactions. After the 
dollar devaluation, many people exchanged their dollar holdings into złoty in 
fear of further losses, and the government perceived this as a gain in the cur-
rency’s reputation. Besides, the depreciation also brought about a relief in 
Poland’s foreign indebtedness, which had already started with the depreciation 
of the pound sterling, but most foreign debt was in dollar (Zweig 1944: 62-64). 
At the London Conference in July 1933, Polish delegates had the opportu-
nity to demonstrate their adherence to the gold-exchange standard and joined 
the “gold bloc” formed by France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. In 
its Bulletin for autumn 1933, the Bank of Poland reported that “the access of 
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Poland to the so-called ‘gold-bloc’ made a good impression” (Bank of Poland 
1933: 83). The government probably hoped for some real effects of its adher-
ence to the gold bloc, and at least in one respect this Polish policy was success-
ful: it helped to reduce Poland’s economic dependency on Germany and pre-
vented Poland to loose “friendly” capital. Not only did the share of Germany in 
Polish foreign trade decline (Table 2), but also did the share of German capital 
in Polish enterprises (from 23% in 1933 to 19% in 1936). Instead, the share of 
France remained unchanged (at 24%) and the joint share of the Gold Bloc 
members without Italy slightly increased (40%, 43%).  
Table 2: Polish Foreign Trade Relations, 1924-1936 
Shares in Total Polish Imports/ Shares in Total Polish Exports 
  Germany Austria UK and Ireland France GoldBloc 
1924 34.5/ 43.2 11.7/ 10.1 7.5/ 10.5 4.9/ 4.2 15.2/ 10.0 
1925 31.0/ 41.3 9.7/ 12.4 7.9/ 7.9 5.8/ 1.7 15.1/ 7.9 
1926 23.6/ 25.3 6.8/ 10.3 10.5/ 17.1 7.4/ 3.6 20.2/ 12.4 
1927 25.5/ 32.0 6.5/ 11.0 9.4/ 12.2 7.5/ 1.7 18.3/ 10.4 
1928 26.9/ 34.3 6.6/ 12.4 9.3/ 9.1 7.4/ 1.7 18.6/ 9.8 
1929 27.3/ 31.2 5.8/ 10.5 8.5/ 10.2 6.9/ 2.2 18.9/ 10.2 
1930 27.0/ 25.8 5.7/ 9.3 7.9/ 12.1 6.7/ 3.1 19.6/ 12.4 
1931 24.5/ 16.8 5.1/ 9.3 7.1/ 16.9 7.5/ 5.5  22.3/ 17.5 
1932 20.1/ 16.2 4.4/ 8.0 8.7/ 16.4 6.9/ 5.7 22.1/ 20.8 
1933 17.6/ 17.5 4.3/ 5.8 10.0/ 19.2 6.8/ 5.5 21.7/ 20.2 
1934 13.6/ 16.5 4.6/ 5.9 10.8/ 21.2 5.8/ 4.2 21.2/ 19.3 
1935 14.4/ 15.1 4.8/ 6.4 13.5/ 19.9  4.9/ 3.5 18.8/ 18.3 
Source: Rocznik Handlu Zagranicznego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Główny Urząd Sta-
tystyczny. Warsaw, various years. 
 
The latter increased even in absolute terms (own calculations based on Wel-
lisz 1938, Appendix A). Nevertheless, there are signs that the underlying fac-
tors behind Polish monetary orthodoxy started to change just before the Lon-
don Conference, namely with the changing international situation after the 
conferences of Lausanne (July 1932) and Geneva (from February 1932 on-
wards). Piłsudski’s growing mistrust in his French ally, which at these confer-
ences showed little interest in the security of Poland’s western border, was 
expressed in cancelling the extension of the French military mission in Poland 
in August 1932 (see Wandycz 1988: 236ff.). Shortly after the appointment of 
Hitler as German chancellor in January 1933, Piłsudski aimed to test the reli-
ability of his French ally by ostensibly strengthening the small Polish garrison 
on Westerplatte in Gdansk on 6 March 1933, violating international agree-
ments. In France and Germany, this was interpreted as Polish willingness to 
prepare a preventive war against German attempts of a border revision, and 
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France warned Poland to proceed (Wandycz 1988: 271). Hence, Poland found 
herself in a strategic deadlock, with France unwilling to provide military sup-
port and a new dimension of aggression from the German side.  
In this situation, there were signs of a strategic reorientation to reduce de-
pendency on France and gain room de manoeuvre for Poland, especially to gain 
time and means for building up an independent Polish armament industry. 
Interestingly, it was just in March 24th, 1933 that the reserve requirements of 
the Bank of Poland were changed, which might be interpreted as a first, very 
cautious step to reorient monetary policy. Foreign currencies and bills of ex-
change were eliminated as legal reserve and the legal cover ratio was reduced 
to 30% of notes and sight liabilities in excess of 100 million złoty. On this 
basis, the actual cover ratio in March 1933 was 44.8% (Smith 1936). Hence, 
while the Bank of Poland’s notes were still redeemable in currencies converti-
ble into gold at mint parity and Poland was arguably still on the gold-exchange 
standard, it would have in principle allowed the Bank of Poland to engineer 
some monetary expansion. Indeed, in difference to other countries on gold, 
Poland managed a stabilization of M1 in 1933 and a very small increase after-
wards (Bernanke 2000: 140), due a cautious credit expansion (Karpiński 1958: 
166). But still, this can hardly be interpreted as expansionary monetary policy 
since the cover ratio was kept well above the legal requirement (Knakiewicz 
1967: 148) and contraction in private banking continued. Zawadzki and others, 
responsible for monetary policy, and backed by Piłsudski himself, still believed 
that the benefits from deflation were higher than its cost. But by 1933 they had 
certainly lost their illusions on French help. According to the testimony of 
Adam Koc, deputy minister of finance under Zawadzki and another confident 
of Piłsudski, “cooperation with French capital was the aim of our economic 
policy (…) up to the beginning of 1933” (cited after Wandycz 1988: 454).  
The surprising rapprochement between Poland and Germany with the Non-
Aggression Pact of January 1934, concluded for a period of 10 years, fits well 
into the picture of Poland trying to gain time (Wandycz 1988). While the pact 
served Hitler to substantiate his claim of peaceful intentions after leaving the 
League (Bullock 1962: 325), for the Polish government it was a main step of 
turning away from France towards a balanced neutrality between Moscow and 
Berlin, based on its own strengths. To this end, Polish military circles pressed 
for a rapid modernization of the army, visible in dramatic changes in the mili-
tary budget after 1933 towards modern weapons, and for a state-funded arma-
ment industry. But Piłsudski himself was reluctant to follow their far-reaching 
requests (Krzyżanowski 1976: 85ff.). Among the several effects of the death of 
Marshall Piłsudski in May 1935 was the political comeback of Kwiatkowski, 
“father of the harbour of Gdynia”, who had left the government in 1930 over a 
row with the Marshall about the oppression of the democratic opposition and 
argued for a strong interventionist economic policy (Drozdowski 2001). In 
October 1935 Kwiatkowski replaced Zawadzki as minister of finance, and in 
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December 1935 the Cabinet decided on a 4-year investment plan that merged 
older plans for “big-push” industrialization with plans for setting up a large-
scale Polish armament industry to be concentrated in the “Security Triangle” 
formed by Vistula and San (see Strobel 1975; Landau and Tomaszewski 1999). 
In the meantime the economic pressure to finally release the “golden fetters” 
had increased sharply, with a large decline in Poland’s reserves from mid-1935 
onwards, mainly due to the imposition of new exchange restrictions in Ger-
many and elsewhere. Poland’s membership in the gold-bloc had become a 
façade without any economic foundations.  
The time to act finally came in March 1936 with the remilitarization of the 
Rhineland, when Germany de facto cancelled the treaty of Locarno. Poland 
signalled her preparation to support France in an armed conflict in the spirit of 
the 1921 convention, but France did not react (Ciałowicz 1970: 216f). More-
over, the changing political climate in France, with an expected success of 
Blum’s Front Populaire, questioned the future of the gold bloc altogether 
(Mouré 2002: 209ff.). On 9th April, 1936 a National Defence Fund was set up 
by presidential decree to be equipped with 1 billion złoty over the period 1937-
40 in order to finance the modernization of Poland’s army (Krzyżanowski 
1976: 146), apparently in anticipation of a radical change in monetary policy. 
Only two weeks later, on 26nd April, 1936 another presidential decree intro-
duced exchange controls, and thereby ended Poland’s adherence to the gold-
exchange standard. The half-official Monthly Bulletin of the state-owned Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), published in French, defended this step as 
follows:  
Therefore, the introduction of exchange controls was not directly determined 
by economic difficulties. The Polish government saw itself forced to this radi-
cal step in the first place in order to fight the currency speculation, which has 
developed recently, and to stop the tendencies of hoarding, encouraged mainly 
by events from the domain of international politics. The aggravation of the po-
litical situation in Europe and the threat of war have had a negative impact on 
all countries and in the first place on the members of the gold bloc (…) (BGK 
1936, IX (4), p. 2). 
4. Conclusion 
This paper examined the decision of the Polish government to adhere to the 
gold standard during the great depression. Based on an econometric analysis 
for eight European countries 1928-1936 (provided in Wolf 2007) the Polish 
case does indeed stand out. The “traditional” hypotheses on the extent of the 
shocks (captured by price deflation, industrial production and unemployment), 
the credibility of further adherence (captured by changes in foreign exchange 
and gold reserves and the status of the two potential monetary hegemons UK 
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and US), and “mentality” or the experience of previous inflations that feature 
prominently in the Polish historiography (Knakiewicz 1967, Landau and 
Tomaszewski 1999) cannot explain the late exit in 1936. The model predicts 
the late exit of Poland only if the “authoritarian” character of the Piłsudski 
regime and the fact that Poland is highly integrated with France are taken into 
account – rather “black boxes” than satisfying explanations. To explore these 
black boxes I argue that the Piłsudski regime that ruled Poland since May 1926 
was mainly concerned with strategies to defend the independence and territorial 
integrity of the new Polish state against foreign (esp. German) aggression. The 
perceived risk that leaving the gold standard can produce monetary instability 
was in part due to the Polish experience of hyperinflation until 1923 followed 
by a second inflation in 1925-26. But in difference to other countries that ex-
perienced a hyperinflation in the 1920s, the Polish government was afraid of 
some additional costs of leaving gold: loosing acess to „friendly” capital in 
terms of the political system of Versailles. It is obvious that for her long-run 
development Poland desperately needed capital accumulation, through savings 
and capital imports. But the Polish government made some effort to be selec-
tive with regard to capital imports, increasingly so after the open conflict with 
Germany about renegotiating trade conditions since 1925. It continued these 
efforts during the Great Depression and the exit of Germany from gold in 1931 
with France staying on gold created an incentive for the Piłsudski government 
to stay as well. French armament credits, both existing ones and others under 
negotiation well into 1936 complete this picture. Bold rhetoric of monetary 
orthodoxy, and several external factors including some signs of economic 
recovery in late 1932 helped the Polish government to defend this position, 
which culminated in Poland joining the “gold bloc” in July 1933.  
Ironically, just from 1933 onwards the pendulum slowly started to swing 
back. Increasing tensions with France, a temporal improvement in Polish-
German relations, and worsening economic conditions reopened the discussion 
about monetary policy. The Central Bank started to engineer a slow increase in 
M1 from 1934 onwards, but most importantly, there was a growing pressure 
from military circles to speed up the modernization of the Polish army, even 
without French support. In October 1935 E. Kwiatkowski, just appointed min-
ister of finance, started to realize his old plans of big push industrialization 
merged with military plans to set-up a Polish armament industry. After the 
Rhine crisis of March 1936 had proved French unwillingness to fight for the 
political system of Versailles, and the defenders of the Franc Poincaré started 
to retreat, Poland prepared the exit decision. In April 9 1936 a 1 Billion Złoty 
National Defence Fund was set up to finance the modernization of Poland’s 
army, before Poland introduced exchange controls in April 26 1936 and 
thereby finally left the gold-exchange standard.  
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Appendix to Section II: Definition of Variables 
This section describes briefly the variables used in Wolf (2007) to estimate the 
logit- and the duration-models. To capture the simple idea that the probability 
to exit should depend on how badly the economy was hit by the Great Depres-
sion I collected monthly data on wholesale prices (whole), industrial production 
(ind), and rates of unemployment (unrate). The hypothesis to be tested is that, 
ceteris paribus, countries experiencing more severe price deflation, a steeper 
decline in industrial production, and a higher number in registered unemployed 
per active population in month t face more pressure to release their gold fetters 
than others in month t+1.  
Second, the idea that countries adhered to the gold standard to gain in credi-
bility is explored by using the value of foreign exchanges (exchange) and gold 
reserves (gold) in month t. The commitment to stay on gold in month t+1 is the 
more credible, the higher a country’s reserves in gold and foreign exchange in 
month t. Moreover, I add an indicator variable ukus_offgold to capture the 
effect of the UK and the USA leaving the gold standard on the sample coun-
tries (the variable equals 0 as long as both are still on gold, 1 after the UK left 
gold, and 2 when both are off gold). A significant coefficient with a positive 
sign would indicate that the exit of these core countries out of the gold ex-
change system increased the probability of other countries to follow off gold.  
Third, the effect of historical experience on the “mentality” of policymakers 
and their electorates is captured first by the parity at which a country resume 
the gold standard in the 1920s as a percentage of its pre-war parity (devalhist), 
varying from values close to 0 to 100. To explore the idea that markets may 
have considered the risk of producing hyperinflation to be lower under institu-
tions that assure central bank independence, I use a measure of central bank 
independence (indep) from Simmons (1994) that varies from 4 (non-existent 
government input) to 1 (chief executives and board of bank appointed by the 
government).  
For the extended model I included variables on the political regime and pat-
terns of trade integration. The prevailing political regime is captured by a sim-
ple 0,1 dummy (democracy), that equals 1 if the country is a parliamentary 
democracy and 0 otherwise. While this changes in the cases of Austria and 
Germany from 0 to 1 in 1933, the variable is constant over the sample time 
because both countries left the gold standard already in 1931. Finally, I analyse 
the idea that trade integration might have affected a country’s decision to either 
join the Sterling-Bloc or the Reichsmark-Bloc and hence leave the gold stan-
dard or to join the Gold-Bloc and hence stay on Gold as discussed in Ritschl 
and Wolf (2003). I use their estimates of bilateral trade integration with the 
potential anchor countries Great Britain, Germany, and France, based on a 
gravity model of bilateral trade flows for an international cross-section of coun-
tries in 1928 (int28_f, int28_g, int28_uk). This measure captures the idea of 
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integration in the sense of (positive or negative) deviation from “normalized” 
bilateral trade flows after controlling for geographical proximity and the sizes 
of trading partners, hence a country can well be better integrated with its sec-
ond largest trading partner than with its largest trading partner. To account for 
other trade-network effects, I also include a dummy variable tradegold, which 
equals 1 as long as the country’s major trading partner is on the gold standard 
and 0 else.  
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